(April 12, 1925 – May 16, 2011)
Early years
Davis was born in Cambridge, Massachusetts. He graduated from Brown University in 1944. That year he obtained a commission as an ensign in the U.S. Navy. He served aboard the aircraft carrier Lake Champlain until 1946. He taught at the The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and received his doctorate there in 1960.Diplomatic career
Davis joined the foreign service in 1947. From 1962 to 1965, he was an assistant to Peace Corps director Sargent Shriver and eventually became the deputy director. He left the Peace Corps in 1965.He served as Lyndon Johnson's senior advisor on Soviet and Eastern European affairs, and as the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in the Ford administration from 1975-1976. He also served as the United States Envoy to Bulgaria (1965–1966), and Ambassador to Guatemala (1968–1971), Ambassador to Chile (1971–1973), and Ambassador to Switzerland (1976–1977) and Director General of the Foreign Service (1973–1975), among other postings.
Resignation
Main article: Operation IA Feature
Operation IA Feature, a covert Central Intelligence Agency operation, authorized U.S. government support for Jonas Savimbi's UNITA and Holden Roberto's FNLA militants in Angola. President Gerald Ford approved the program on July 18, 1975 despite strong opposition from officials in the State Department, most notably Davis, and the CIA. Two days prior to the program's approval Davis told Henry Kissinger, the Secretary of State, that he believed maintaining the secrecy of IA Feature would be impossible. Davis correctly predicted the Soviet Union would respond by increasing its involvement in Angola, leading to more violence and negative publicity for the United States. When Ford approved the program Davis resigned.[2] John Stockwell, the CIA's station chief in Angola, echoed Davis' criticism saying the program needed to be expanded to be successful, but the program was already too large to be kept out of the public eye. Davis' deputy and former U.S. ambassador to Chile, Edward Mulcahy, also opposed direct involvement. Mulcahy presented three options for U.S. policy towards Angola on May 13, 1975. Mulcahy believed the Ford administration could use diplomacy to campaign against foreign aid to the Communist MPLA, refuse to take sides in factional fighting, or increase support for the FNLA and UNITA. He warned however that supporting UNITA would not sit well with Mobutu Sese Seko, the ruler of Zaire.[3][4][5]
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